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STUDENT NOTES
FEDERAL STATE PIOSECMnONS FOR SANI OFFsE
There is no principle better established in the common law,
or more fully recognized in the federal and state constitutions than
that a. person shall not be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.1
The problem presented is whether a defendant, who, by committing
a single act violates both a state and a federal statute designed to
punish the actor for such offense, is protected by the constitutional
prohibitions against double jeopardy. The situation occurs when the
state and the federal government each has made the act committed
an offense punishable under its laws and (1) the defendant subse-
quent to a state conviction or acquittal is involved in a federal
prosecution under the federal law or, (2) the defendant is being
tried by a state court after he had either been acquitted or con-
victed by a federal court. In two recent cases before the Supreme
Court: of the United States, which involved these situations, it was
1 U. S. CONST. amend. VI; W. VA. CONsr. art. 3, § 5; Green v. United
States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957). All states, either expressly in their constitu-
tions or as part of their common law prohibit double jeopardy.
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held that such procedure did not place the defendant in double
jeopardy and thus did not violate the constitutional guarantee.
2
The problem of successive prosecutions by a state and the fed-
eral government is not a new one. The cases decided in the Supreme
Court indicate that there have been two lines of thought on the
subject. In the earliest case dealing with a fact situation which was
similar to those in the Abbate and Bartkus cases, the court, in reply
to defendant's contention that admitting the state's jurisdiction
would bar court martial authority or else subject defendant to pos-
sible subsequent prosecution, observed that: ". . . If the jurisdic-
tion of the two courts be concurrent, the sentence of either court,
either of conviction or acquittal might be pleaded in bar of the
prosecution before the other. . ... ,
The dissenting opinion in agreeing with the majority on this
point, expressed the view that such a procedure would be "repug-
nant to both the principles of the common law, and the genius of
our free government."- Following this early approach, it would
seem that trial by the state and the federal government for the
same offense was contrary to the principles of justice as well as the
express language of the constitution.
However, in subsequent cases there was a complete transition
from the doctrine that a prior conviction or acquittal in the courts
of one sovereign would be a bar to a prosecution in the courts of the
other sovereign. In the first of these cases the Supreme Court de-
cided that one act could constitute an offense against the United
States and a state and consequently each government could punish
that portion of the offense that contravened its law.5 Thus in Fox v.
Ohio,6 the Supreme Court decided that a state could punish the
fraud in passing counterfeit coins and the United States could pun-
ish the counterfeiting which was an offense against its laws, and
which resulted from the same act. Shortly after this decision, the
Court held that the federal government could punish the same
aCt.7 These decisions led to the concept that the same act could
constitute two entirely separate and distinct offenses.
2 Abbate v. United States, 79 S.Ct. 666 (1959); Bartus v. Illinois, 79
S.Ct. 676 (1959).
8 Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) 1 (1820).
4Id. at 47.
5 Fox v. Ohio 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847).
6 Ibid.
7 United States v. Marigold, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 560 (1850); see also,
Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13 (1852).
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In a later decision, however, the Supreme Court, in a case that
was a clear instance of successive prosecution by different states,
expressed the view that the court which acquired jurisdiction of the
person first could prosecute him and that the court's judgment was
final, and would prevent the courts of another jurisdiction from
prosecuting the offender for the same infraction.8
In Lanza v. United States, the first case concerning a situation
of possible double prosecution in which the Supreme Court was
unable to avoid this result,9 the Court accepted as settled law that:
... [A]n act denounced as a crime by both national and state
sovereignties is an offense against the peace and dignity of both
and may be punished by each. The Fifth Amendment . . . applies
only to proceedings by the Federal Government, ... and the dou-
ble jeopardy therein forbidden is a second prosecution under
authority of the Federal Government after a first trial for the
same offense under the same authority."10
This decision established a rule of successive prosecution which
was followed with approval in an overwhelming number of deci-
sions."
The West Virginia law concerning the successive prosecutions
rule is consistent with this federal rule and the rule of the majority
of the states. The substance of the principle is embodied in the fol-
lowing statement: ". . by a single act of engaging in the manufac-
ture or sale of intoxicating liquors, one may be guilty of two
offenses, one against the state and the other against the United
States, and the conviction and punishment for such offender for one
of such offenses is no bar to his prosecution in the courts of the
other sovereignty for the offense against it."12 Consistent with this
view, the West Virginia court in a later case held that the double
jeopardy provision of the West Virginia constitution could not be
8 Nielson v. Oregon, 212 U.S. 315, 320 (1909).
9 See: Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907) which held that
since the court martial and the Phillipie Criminal Court derive their authority
from the same ultimate source (the federal government) an acquittal by the
court martial prevents subsequent prosecution in the civil courts for violation
of a statute punishing the same offense. See also, United States v. Mason,
213 U.S. 115, 124 (1909).
'C United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1920).
1' Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312 (1926): see, Abbate v. United States,
supra note 2, at 670.
12State v. Henson, 91 W. Va. 701, 702, 114 S.E. 273 (1922).
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pleaded as a defense by one indicated under the state statute upon
the ground that he had been previously indicted, tried, and con-
victed under a federal statute penalizing the same act.13 The West
Virginia court, reasoned that the court would not deprive the state
government of an essential element of sovereignty by holding the
state government powerless to punish a person who has also violated
the state law, although the accused had already been prosecuted by
the federal government for the same act.14
However, some states, by statute, now provide that a conviction
or acquittal in a prosecution by another jurisdiction is a defense to
the prosecution in such state.15 New York, for example, has en-
acted a statute which provides that "when an act charged as a
crime is within the jurisdiction of another state, territory, or coun-
try, as well as within the jurisdiction of this state, a conviction or
acquittal thereof in the former is a bar to the prosecution or indict-
ment therefor in the state."' 6 The action taken by such states re-
flects a dissatisfaction with the result reached by the Lanza inter-
pretation.
The effect of the decisions has greatly limited the constitutional
guarantee against double jeopardy. However, this being the view
in the federal courts, in West Virginia and in the majority of the
states, the purpose of this article is to examine the rule to ascer-
tain the propriety of retaining it. It has been said that the purpose
of the double jeopardy clause is to prevent a second punishment
"so far as the common law gave that protection."17 The English
common law view is that, if the state and federal courts should
have concurrent jurisdiction, acquittal or conviction by one might
be pleaded in bar of prosecution by the other.'8 On an international
scale it has been held that, where an act constitutes a crime against
the law of nations punishable by any nation, a plea of prior con-
viction by one nation would prevent prosecution by another nation
for that same offense.19 It should be noted that the federal and
state double jeopardy problem is also parallelled in situations in-
'3 State v. Holesapple, 92 W. Va. 645, 115 S.E. 794 (1923).
14 State v. Henson, supra note 12, at 707.
15 N.Y. Cmm. PROCEDUm CODE § 189; Cal. PENAL CODE § 656.
16 N.Y. ClM. PROCEDURE CODE § 139.
17 Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 170 (1873).
Is Grant, Successive Prosecutions by State and Nation, 4 U.C.L.A. L. REv.
1,8 (1956).
'9 United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184 (1820).
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volving prosecutions by a state and a city, prosecutions by different
states, and prosecutions involving offenses in separate counties.20
It is true that a single act may violate two statutes if one of the
statutes requires proof of a fact not required by the other statute,2'
and each statute is designed to protect a different social interest.22
Under these considerations, if either the state or the federal govern-
ment alone in the Abbate or Bartkus cases, supra, had administered
the double prosecution for the same infraction, it would have con-
stituted double jeopardy.
U'Ie rule of successive prosecutions for the same offense by
separate sovereignties can operate only if the state and the federal
government can constitutionally exercise concurrent jurisdiction
over the same offense. Under our federal system of government
specific powers are delegated to the federal governmnt.28 All other
powers not expressly granted are reserved to the states.24 States
may exercise powers delegated to the federal government, but if
the federal government "occupies the field" the state may be pre-
cluded from acting.25 Under this view the federal and state laws
may not be operative at the same time with respect to the same
subject and thus only one law may be enforced. Thus, it has been
said that once Congress has acted, its law preempts all state laws
penalizing the same offense. Nevertheless, if the court finds that
Congress intended concurrent jurisdiction, then the state laws are
valid. 2
6
Where concurrent jurisdiction does exist, it may be based on
either the police power of the state or on a constitutional provision
such as the Eighteenth Amendment which specifically provides for
concurrent power. The prosecution of crimes against the state is an
20 State v. Mills, 108 W. Va. 31, 150 S.E. 42 (1929) (involving prosecu-
tions by a state and a municipality). State v. Commonwealth, 239 Ky. 620,
40 SAV.2d 389 (1931) (two different states); State v. Shimman, 122 Ohio
St. 52:3, 172 N.E. 867 (1930) (offenses in separate counties). See also, 1
WHARTON, CmINAL LAW AND PxocEDrauE § § 145, 146 (12th ed. 1957). For
an analagous situation see, W. VA. CODE ch. 50, art. 18, § 1 (Michie 1955)
which contains a proviso that ". . . whenever a person has been convicted
in the municipal or police court of any incorporated town or city, such con-
viction shall be a bar to any criminal proceedings before a justice for the
same offense."
21 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
22 Kirchheimer, The Act, the Offense and Double Jeopardy, 58 YALE L.J.
513 (1949).
2S U. S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8.
24: U. S. CONsT. amend. X.
21 Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens, 53 U. S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
2C Kelly v. Washington, 302 U. S. 1, 10 (1938).
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area which has always been within the scope of state law enforce-
ment. Federal legislation had introduced federal power into the
area of routine law enforcement with the result that there is no
longer the concept of rigid separation of federal and state powers
in criminal law enforcement. In the field of true crimes against
the state the doctrine of federal premption would not be invoked
to preclude the states from enforcing its criminal laws.
In Pennsylvania v. Nelson, the United States Supreme Court
has indicated that the court is aware of the problem created by the
American doctrine of dual sovereignties. The court held that Con-
gress, in passing a sedition law, occupied the field in such a manner
as to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject 27 The
court observed that: "We are not unmindful of the risk of com-
pounding punishments which would be created by concurrent state
power. In our view of the case, we do not reach the question
whether double or multiple punishment for the same overt acts
directed against the United States has constitutional sanction. With-
out compelling indication to the contrary, we will not assume that
Congress intended to permit the possibility of double punishment" 28
However, in a recent decision, the Supreme Court has backed
down from the Nelson principle. In Uphaus v. Wyman,29 the court
held that the Smith Act, although superseding the enforceability of
state sedition statutes prescribing the same conduct, does not bar
state prosecution for sedition against the state itself. When there is
some aspect of local police power involved the state laws will still
be operative. Thus both the state and the federal government can
continue to punish such overlapping offenses as bank robbery and
theft from a post office since the criminal conduct also involves a
local breach of the peace.
The court in the Lanza and Abbate cases, supra, justifies the
result that they reached on the basis of protection of federal law
enforcement The court reasons that, if the states alone were per-
mitted to prosecute criminal acts and the states provided only a
nominal punishment, the offender could submit to the state court
and thus secure immunity from federal prosection. In the normal
situation, however, there would not be such a variance between
punishment under a state law and the penalty under the federal
27350 U. S. 497 (1956).
28 Id. at 509-10.
29 79 Sup. Ct. 1040 (1959).
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law to warrant the above rationale. Furthermore, if the proceed-
ing is a sham, or is a fraudulent one, there is no jeopardy and such
a prior trial will not bar subsequent proceedings.80
The rule permitting both sovereignties to punish an accused
when a single infraction has been committed may be justified when
balanced against the valuable American concept of concurrent
power and dual sovereignties. In this respect, an integral part of the
Bill of Rights has been subverted. The doctrine of federal preemp-
tion could be utilized only in certain limited situations to avert the
inherent objectionability of double punishment by the separate
sovereignties. It would not be invoked to preclude the states from
enforcing its criminal laws. The remedy lies in the legislative
branches to enact laws which expressly provide for the exemption
from -prosecution by another sovereignty, as has been done in sev-
eral of the states.
A. G. H.
30 United States v. Ball, 163 U. S. 662, 669 (1896); Edwards v. Com-
monwealth, 233 Ky. 356, 25 S.W.2d 746 (1930).
7
H.: Federal and State Prosecutions for Same Offense
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1960
